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FOREWORD 
Interest in human settlement systems and policies has been a critical part of 
urban-related work at IIASA since its inception. During the past three years this 
interest has given rise to a concentrated research activity focusing on migration 
dynamics and settlement patterns. Four sub-tasks have formed the core of this 
research effort: 
the study of spatial population dynamics; 
the definition and elaboration of a new research area called demometrics 
and its application to migration analysis and spatial population fore-
casting; 
the analysis and design of migration and settlement policy; 
a comparative study of national migration and settlement patterns and 
policies. 
This paper focuses on normative population modeling. It suggests an exten-
sion of demographic projection models to the policy domain by introducing 
concepts and findings of mathematical system theory. 
Reports, summarizing previous work on migration and settlement at IIASA, 
are listed at the end of this report. 
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Chairman 
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and Services Area 
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This paper explores the analytical features of population distribution or human settlement 
policies. It proposes a methodology for quantitative policy analysis and policy design based on 
optimal control and system theory. The paper consists of two parts. This part shows how policy 
models may be derived from demographic and demoeconomic or demometric models by adding 
a new dimension: the goals- means relationship of population distribution policy. It examines a 
large class of relevant policy models and demonstrates their relationship to the original 
Tinbergen Theory of Policy, which provides a paradigm for static and dynamic policy analysis. 
Problems of existence and of design of optimal population distribution policies are studied 
analytically. In designing optimal policies, use may be made of the minimizing properties of 
generalized inverses. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the dynamics of 
spatial demographic growth. Models for multiregional population growth 
have been developed to describe the growth process and to analyze its 
impact on future population characteristics [Rogers (1975)]. The various 
economic, social, climatological and cultural forces influencing spatial popu-
lation growth have been brought together in explanatory demoeconomic or 
demometric models [Greenwood (1975)]. The mathematical demogr.aphic 
models and the demometric models have a common feature. They are 
designed to describe and to explain the dynamics of the spatial population 
growth. 
Once the dynamics of a phenomenon are understood, human nature comes 
up with the ultimate question: can we control it, and how? The models 
associated with this third concern are population policy models. The subject 
of migration policy models has been introduced by Rogers (1966; 1968, ch. 6; 
*This paper is based on part of my Ph.D. dissertation, entitled The Analytics of Multiregional 
Population Distribution Policy, which was submitted to the Graduate School of Northwestern 
University, Evanston, USA, in 19~6. I have benefited from the close cooperation of Andrei 
Rogers, whose ideas and experience have been most valuable, and I am very grateful to him. 
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1971, pp. 98-108), and more recently a number of authors devoted 
attention to the design of optimal-seeking migration policy models 
[MacKinnon (1975), Mehra (1975), Stern (1974), Evtushenko and 
MacKinnon (1975), Willekens and Rogers (1977), Willekens (1978), and 
Propoi and Willekens (1978)]. 
This paper is devoted to a methodological analysis of migration policy 
models. We assume that a demometric or a demographic model, consisting 
of a system of linear simultaneous equations, has been successfully specified 
and estimated. Therefore, we do not deal with identification and estimation 
procedures. The main thread of the analysis is provided by the Tinbergen 
paradigm, to which we will refer frequently. The paper consists of two highly 
interrelated parts. Part I focuses on the Tinbergen framework itself and on 
its application to population distribution policy making. Part II, which will 
be published in a later issue, addresses the generalization of Tinbergen's ideas 
to dynamic problems, derives consistent formulations of state-space and 
optimal control models, and applies them to the quantitative study of 
dynamic population distribution policies. 
Part I is divided into two major sections, sections 2 and 3. Section 2 
presents a conceptual survey of various possible policy models. Each model 
is related back to the original Tinbergen framework. The matrix of impact 
multipliers, well known in economic analysis, is seen to be of crucial 
importance to the classification scheme. After this s~ction has set the scene, 
we devote our attention to the two central issues in the theory of policy: the 
concepts of existence and of design (section 3). The existence problem deals 
with the question whether the system is controllable, i.e., whether a set of 
arbitrary targets can be achieved at all, given the internal dynamics of the 
system and given the set of available instruments. The answer to the 
controllability problem provides input information for the design problem. In 
designing optimal policies, the policy maker may apply a wide range of 
mathematical programming techniques, assuming that he has a clear idea of 
his preferences. Attention is focused, however, on policy models for which 
solutions may be obtained analytically. The concept of generalized inverse 
has an interesting potential here. 
2. Optimal migration policies: A conceptual framework 
There are several analytical differences between a policy model and a 
conventional demographic or demometric model. The most basic classifi-
cation of variables in any model consists of two categories: endogenous 
variables, which are determined within the model, and exogenous variables, 
which are predetermined. Suppose the population system is linear and may 
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be modeled as 
A{y}=E{z}, (2.1) 
where {y} is a M x 1 vector of endogenous variables, { z} is a L x 1 vector of 
exogenous variables, A is a M x M matrix of coefficients, and E is a M x L 
matrix of coefficients. 
Eq. (2.1) is the reduced form of a population model. The endogenous and 
the exogenous variables are separated. Assuming that A is non-singular, we 
obtain 
{y} = A - 1 E{z} =C{z}, (2.2) 
where C is the matrix of multipliers, i.e., the reduced form matrix. The 
elements of C represent the impact on {y} of a unit change in {z}. 
The policy models treated here, will be discussed with reference to (2.2). 
Tinbergen (1963) proposed a classification of the variables of (2.2) better 
suited for policy analysis. His ideas are general enough to encompass the 
whole range of policy models. Starting from the Tinbergen paradigm, we try 
to present a unified treatment of various classes of models, which are 
relevant for population distribution policy. 
2.1 . The Tinbergen paradigm 
Tinbergen (1963) distinguished two categories of variables in both the 
endogenous and the exogenous variables. The endogenous variables consist 
of target variables, which are of direct interest for policy purposes, and other 
variables which are not. The latter are labeled by Tinbergen as irrelevant 
variables. However, they may be of indirect interest for policy planning, since 
their values may in turn influence various target variables. The exogenous 
variables are divided according to their controllability. Instrument variables 
are subject to direct control by the policy authorities. Data variables are 
beyond their control. The latter include exogenously predetermined and 
uncontrollable variables, as well as lagged endogenous variables. They define 
the environment in which the levels of instrument variables have to be set. 
Applying this approach, eq. (2.2) may be partitioned to give 
where {y1 } is the N x 1 vector of target variables, {y2 } is the (M -N) x 1 
vector of other endogenous variables, { z i} is the K x 1 vector of instrument 
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variables, {z2 } is the (L-K) x 1 vector of uncontrollable exogenous variables 
and lagged endogenous variables, and R, S, P, Q are conformable partitions 
of the model's reduced form matrix. 
The value of the target vector is 
(2.3) 
The policy problem, as formulated by Tinbergen, is to choose an appropriate 
value of the instrument vector { z i} so as to render the value of the target 
vector {y 1 } equal to some previously established desired value {yi}. The 
choice of the level of the instrument variables depends on the levels of the 
uncontrollable variables, represented by { z2 }, and on how much they affect 
the targets. 
It is important to keep in mind that the policy model (2.3) is derived from 
the explanatory model (2.2) by adding a new dimension to (2.2). This new 
dimension is the goals- means relationship of population policy. The explan-
atory model may be a pure demographic model, relating population growth 
and distribution to demographic factors such as fertility , mortality and 
migration. It may also be a demometric model, which statistically relates 
spatial population growth to socioeconomic variables. Any model may be 
converted into a policy model if and only if all the target variables of the 
policy model are part of the set of endogenous variables of the explanatory 
model and if at least one of the exogenous variables is controllable. Most 
migration models found in the literature are single-equation models with 
gross or net migration as the dependent variable. They serve only a restricted 
category of policy models, namely those with targets that consist of 
migration levels and instruments which are socioeconomic in nature. Various 
regional economic models include migration as an exogenous variable. 
Therefore, they are not suited to become migration policy models if 
population distribution is the goal. Simultaneous equation models, such as 
the ones developed by Greenwood (1973, 1975) and Olvey (1972), are 
relevant to model population policy problems of all types, because they 
include demographic and socioeconomic variables in both the set of en-
dogenous and the set oi exogenous variables. Thus they may be applied in 
situations where the goals- means relationship consists of demographic, as 
well as of socioeconomic measures. Finally, the multiregional population 
growth models of Rogers (1975) may be converted to policy models to study 
purely demographic policy problems, i.e., both targets and instruments are 
demographic in nature. 
Before proceding, it may be important to stress that the analytical solution 
of Tinbergen's formulation of the policy problem is restricted to linear policy 
models. If the model is non-linear, one can only solve it numerically through 
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simulation. In this paper, we only deal with linear models and their 
analytical solutions and do not discuss the simulation approach. 
2.2. Survey of policy models 
Conceptually, any policy model may be related to (2.3). For convenience, 
we drop the subscript of the target vector, 
Throughout our discussion of policy models, it will be assumed that both the 
targets and the instruments are linearly independent. The matrix R then 
plays a crucial role in policy analysis. The existence of an optimal policy, i.e., 
a solution to (2.3), depends on the rank of R. The design of an optimal 
policy, i.e., the assignment of values to the instrument variables, depends on 
the structure of R, and on the values of its entries. In economic literature, the 
matrix R is known as the matrix of impact multipliers. The name refers to the 
fact that an element rii gives the change in the value of the target variable i 
when the instrument variable j is varied by one unit. The ratio - rufrik is the 
amount by which the jth instrument may be cut down without changing the 
level of the ith target, if the value of the kth instrument is increased with one 
unit. It is, therefore, the marginal rate of substitution between two instru-
ments [Fromm and Taubman (1968, p. 109)]. 
It is the purpose of this section to classify relevant policy models without 
going into technical detail. Detailed treatment will be given later. The survey 
revolves · around the matrix multiplier R and its characteristics. A first 
classification scheme is based on the rank of R, or alternatively on the 
relation between the number of targets and the number of instruments. A 
second classification scheme relates to the structure of R. The structure of R 
also provides us with a link between the reduced form models and the 
models of optimal control. 
2.2.1 . Classification of policy models according to the rank of the matrix 
multiplier 
We may distinguish between three categories of policy models : R is non-
singular and of rank N , R is singular and of rank K , R is singular and of 
rank N. The parameters K and N are respectively, the number of instruments 
and the number of targets . An illustration is given by a typical policy model, 
namely the Theil (1964) model. 
(a ) The matrix multiplier is non-singular and of rank N. If R is non-
singular, i.e., if there are as many instruments as there are targets, then there 
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exists a unique combination of instruments leading to the set of desired 
targets. Once the targets are specified, the unique vector is given by 
(2.4) 
The solution to (2.3) is unique, and there is no need for the policy maker to 
provide any other information than the set of target values. 
(b) The matrix multiplier is singular and of rank K < N. If the number of 
instruments is less than the number of targets, however, the system (2.3) is 
inconsistent and there is no way that all the target values can be reached. 
This poses an additional decision problem for the policy maker. Does he give 
up some targets in order to reach others, or does he want to achieve all the 
targets as closely as possible with the limited resources? In the latter case, 
the policy maker may also wish to weight the targets differently. If the first 
alternative is chosen, some targets are deleted, and the instrument vector is 
given by (2.4). The second alternative often leads to the formulation of a 
quadratic programming model. If {.V} is the vector of desired target values, 
and {.V} is the vector of realized values, then the problem is to minimize the 
squared deviation between {.V} and {Y} subject to (2.3), which describes the 
behavior of the population system. That is, 
min[{.V}-{Y}J' A[{y}-{y}J, (2.5) 
subject to 
{y} =R{zi} +S{z2 }. (2.6) 
The weight matrix A represents the policy maker's differential preferences 
towards the targets. The target variables with the highest weights will be 
forced very close to their desired values. Those with the lowest weights will 
not. 
(c) The matrix multiplier is singular and of rank N . If the number of 
instrument variables exceeds the number of targets, then there is an infinite 
number of solutions to (2.3) and, therefore, an infinite number of instrument 
vectors. To get a unique solution, the policy maker may force the number of 
instruments to be equal to the number of targets, by deleting some 
instruments. On the other hand, he may put some constraints on the 
instruments. 
By restricting the value instruments may take, the freedom of policy action 
is reduced in a way such that only one strategy is available to achieve the 
targets. Some alternative restrictions will be introduced later in the paper. 
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(d) Illustration: The Theil quadratic programming model. We have de-
scribed how policy models are related to the rank of the matrix of impact 
multipliers or, equivalently, to the number of targets and instruments. Only 
some alternative policy models have been indicated. A wider variety is 
possible. For example, the targets and the instruments may be constrained at 
the same time, and these constraints need not be linear. The objective 
function (2.5) may not be quadratic, and (2.6) can be supplemented with 
both equality and inequality constraints. The reader is referred to the 
mathematical programming literature for such illustrations. The quadratic 
objective function with linear constraints, however, is common in economic 
policy analysis. It is based on two assumptions. The first is that the policy 
maker's preferences are quadratic in targets and controls. The second 
assumption is that each of the targets depends linearly on all the instruments, 
the coefficients of these linear relations being fixed and known. The basic 
structure of this linear quadratic model is due to Theil (1964, pp. 34-35), and 
may be expressed as 
min W={a}'{zi}+{b} '{y} (2.7) 
+H{zi} ' A{zi} + {Y} 'Q{Y} + {zi} 'C{y} + {y}C'{zi}J, 
subject to (2.3), 
{y} =R{zi} +S{z2 }, 
where {Y} is the vector of realized values of the target variables, { z 1 } is the 
vector of instrument variables, { z2 } is the vector of exogenous variables, A, 
Q, C are weight matrices, and R, S are matrices of multipliers. 
Applications of the Theil model in economic policy literature may be 
found in Fox, Sengupta and Thorbecke (1972, p. 215), and in Friedman 
(1975, pp. 158-160). To simplify matters we may suppose that {a}= {b} = {O} 
and C = 0. The problem then reduces to 
min 1[{.Y}' Q{y} + { zi}' A { zi}J, 
subject to (2.3), 
{y} =R{zi} +S{z2 }, 
(2.8) 
where Q and A are weights attached to the target vector and to the 
instrument vector respectively. 
To illustrate the application of the Theil model in migration policy 
analysis, consider the following problem. The costs of public services are held 
to be too high because some regions are over-urbanized and are subject to 
diseconomies of scale, while other areas have insufficient people to reach the 
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threshold needed for an efficient public service system. The high costs in the 
public sector can, therefore, be related to the inefficient population distri-
bution. To reduce the costs, a migration policy is needed. However, there is a 
cost associated with the redistribution of people over space. Assume that the 
cost function of public services is a quadratic function of the population 
distribution {y}, i.e., 
CP = { b }' {Y} + {y}' E {y}. (2.9) 
Assume also that the cost associated with population distribution is quad-
ratic in the vector of the number of people relocated by the policy program, 
{zi}, i.e., 
(2.10) 
An element z1; of {zi} is positive if the program attracts people to region i. 
It is negative if the program has an out-migration effect. On comparing the 
cost functions with the preference function (2.7), we see that 
{a}= {O}, C=O, Q=2E, 
and 
A=2F. 
Since { zi} represents the additional migration, R =I in the constraint. The 
vector of uncontrollable variables is the population distribution in the 
previous time period, and S is the multiregional population growth matrix. 
2.2.2. Classification of policy models according to the structure of the matrix 
multiplier 
We now turn to the question of how policy models may be related to the 
structure of the matrix R. The structure determines the nature of the 
dependence of {zi} upon {y}. Several assumptions may be adopted to 
simplify the form of R. They have been studied by Tinbergen (1963, ch. 4), by 
Fox, Sengupta and Thorbecke (1972, pp. 24-25) and by Friedman (1975, pp. 
149- 153) among others. We consider four different structures of R: diagonal, 
triangular, block-diagonal and block-triangular. Our illustration considers the 
block-triangular multiperiod policy model. 
(a) The matrix multiplier is diagonal. If R is diagonal, then each target 
variable can be associated with one and only one instrument variable and 
vice versa. Since R- 1 is also diagonal, eq. (2.4) implies a series of expressions, 
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i=l, ... ,N, 
each of which may be solved independently. The practical implication of this 
is that the policy maker can, in such an instance, pursue each target with a 
single specific instrument, and no coordination between the various policies 
is required. 
(b) The matrix multiplier is triangular. Eq. (2.3) is recursive. The two-way 
simultaneity between the vectors {y} and {zi}, i.e., {zi} affecting {y} and {y} 
affecting { z i}, can be reduced to a unilateral dependence or a unidirectional 
causality. Suppose R is lower triangular, then R- 1 is also lower triangular, 
and the decision making procedure is recursive, 
These expressions may be solved in sequence, and the model has a simple 
policy interpretation. If each equation were assigned to a different policy 
maker, the system of equations would specify a hierarchy. In order to make 
an optimal decision, each policy maker would not need to look at the 
instruments selected by those who were below his position in the hierarchy. 
(c) The matrix multiplier is block-diagonal. In the case of a block-
diagonal policy model, the overall model can be decomposed into several 
independent parts. This would occur if a policy can be decentralized into 
independent subpolicies, each having a goals-means relationship unrelated to 
the goals and the instruments of the other subpolicies. This would permit 
efficient decentralized decision making. 
(d) The matrix multiplier is block-triangular. Here, as in the case of a 
triangular R, the set of instruments corresponding to any given block can be 
solved for without any knowledge of the instruments belonging to blocks 
which are lower in the hierarchy. The overall policy could be decomposed 
into a hierarchical system of policies. 
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(e) Illustration: The multiperiod policy problem. An important application 
of the block-triangular form of R is found in dynamic policy analysis. The 
models presented thus far have been static, but they are general enough to 
handle dynamic policy problems as well. If the entries of the target vector 
and of the instrument vector belong to different time periods, we clearly have 
a dynamic or multiperiod policy model. Suppose, for example, that a target 
vector is given for a sequence of time periods from 1 to T, say. Then {y} is 
itself composed of vectors, one for each time period. Suppose, moreover, that 
there exists an instrument vector for each time period. The reduced form 
model (2.3) now may be expressed as 
{y} =R{zi} +S{z2}, (2.11) 
where 
{y<l)} {z\ll} { z~ll} 
{y<2J} { z\2>} { z~2J} 
{y} = {y(t)} {zi} = { z?>} {z2} = { zg>} 
{y(T)} { z\Tl} { z~T)} l R,, R12 R., J 21 R22 
R= . 
Rn RTT 
[s,, S12 ... 
s., J S21 S22 
S= . 
Sn STT 
Vector {zi} is of order KT, and {z2} and {y} ·are of order NT. The submatrix 
Rii is N x K and its elements are dynamic policy multipliers which express 
the impact on the target vector {y<1>} in time period t = i of changes in the 
instrument vector {z?>} in time period t=j. R is NTxKT; Sis NTxNTand 
the submatrices Sii are of order N x N. S shows the dynamic effects of 
predetermined variables on the target variables. 
Most policy models assume that policy actions do not influence events 
which precede them in time and, therefore, generally ignore expectational 
effects or advance announcement effects. This assumption of unidirectional 
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causality yields a block-triangular R matrix, 
Ro 0 0 0 
Ri Ro 0 
R= R1 Ri (2.12) 
Rr - 1 Rr-2 Ro 
where the elements of R; are dynamic policy multipliers. A triangular R 
matrix leads to a sequential decision making procedure analogous to that of 
the static model. The key distinction is that here the sequence is across time, 
rather than across individual instrument and target variables. 
By way of illustration, consider the application of the Theil model in 
population policy. Assume that there is a time sequence of target population 
distributions, and a time sequence of vectors of induced migration. Suppose 
that no tough policy actions are expected by the potential migrants, therefore 
the population distribution at time t does not depend on the migration 
policies beyond t. Eq. (2.11) may, therefore, be written with R being lower 
block-triangular. 
We may reduce the form of this policy model even further. Suppose that 
the migration policy at time t only affects the population distribution at t + 1 
directly. The impact on the population distributions at a later time is indirect 
in the sense that the population distribution at t + 1 affects the distribution 
beyond t + l. This implies the recurrence equation 
{y(t+ 1)} =R0 {z 1 (t)} +S,+ 1 , 1{y(t)}. (2.13) 
The submatrix S,+ 1 , , is the growth matrix of the population between t and 
t + l. If we assume the growth matrix to be time-independent, i.e., G =S,+ 1 ,, 
for all t, we may write 
{y(t+ 1)} =R0 {z1 (t)} +G{y(t)}. 
Therefore, (2.11) may be reduced to a set of recurrence equations, 
{y(l)} =R0 {z1 (O)} +G{y(O)}, 
{y(2)} =R0 {z 1 (1)} +G{y(l)} 
= R0 { z1 (1)} + GR0 { z1 (O)} + G2 {y(O)}, 
{ y ( t)} = R0 { z 1 ( t - 1)} + G { y ( t - 1 )} 
r-1 
=G'{y(O)} + L Gr - l - iR0 {zi(i)}. 
i=O 
(2.14) 
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In matrix form, we have that 
{y(O)} I {y(O)} 
{y(l)} G Ro {z 1 (O)} 
{y(2)} Gi GR0 Ro {z1(1)} (2.15) 
{y(T)} GT Gr -1 Ro GT -2 Ro Ro {z1 (T-l)} 
Eq. (2.14) has received much attention in system theory. It is called the 
discrete state equation and forms the central component of the discrete 
version of the state-space model. Stimulated by recent work in system theory 
and optimal control, an increasing number of authors have adopted the 
state-space approach to describe dynamic models in the social sciences. 1 We 
have shown how the state-space model may be derived conceptually from the 
reduced form model. 
By introducing the assumption of unidirectional causality ,of the popu-
lation system, we may write the Theil model [(2.8), (2.3)] as 
minJ =t[{.V} 'Q{y} + {zi}' A{zi}J, 
subject to (2.14), 
{y(t+ 1)} =R0 {z1 (t)} +G {y(t)}. 
Recall that Q is a NT x NT matrix, where Tis the planning horizon and N 
the number of target variables at each period, and A is a KT x KTmatrix, 
where K is the number of instrument variables. 
2.2.3. From the Tinbergen model to the optimal control model 
In this section, we started out with the Tinbergen paradigm. The original 
model, based on this paradigm, was simple in the sense that the number of 
instruments was equal to the number of targets and that the optimal policy 
was the unique solution to a system of linear equations. When the number of 
instruments and targets differs, the policy maker is confronted with an 
additional decision problem. He needs to specify his preferences in order to 
get a unique policy which is optimal. This led us to the Theil model and to 
the broad application of mathematical programming. When policy problems 
become large, there is a need for simplification. The simplifying assumptions, 
discussed up to now, are related to the structure of the multiplier matrix R. 
'See, for example, Pindyck (1973), Kenkel (1974) and Chow (1975). 
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The assumption of unidirectional causality of the system, represented by the 
block-triangularity of R is crucial to the further development of dynamic 
policy models. Now we extend the simplification of the policy models to the 
objective function. 
Assume that the effect of the target and control vector at time t on the 
value of the objective function, is independent of the target and control 
vectors at other time periods. This implies that the matrices Q and A are 
block-diagonal. The large multiperiod problem may then be decomposed 
into a sequence of smaller single-period problems. The objective function 
becomes 
T 
mint L {y (t )} ' Q (t ){y(t)} + { z1 (t )} 'A (t ){ z i(t )}. (2.16) 
r=O 
It is assumed that {z1 (T)}={O}. In most practical applications, it is assumed 
that Q(t)=Q is equal for all time periods up to T-1. This assumption is 
only valid if the preference system and tastes do not change over time. It 
also implies that the contribution of a certain set of target and control values 
is independent of when they appear on the time path, since no discounting 
measure has been introduced. Denote the matrix Q(T) by F. The weight 
matrices A (t) associated with the instruments or controls are usually also 
assumed to be time independent, A (t) =A for all t. 
Therefore, we have 
T-1 
mint{y(T)}' F{y(T)} +t L [{Y(t)} ' Q{y(t)}+ {z 1 (t)}' A {zi(t)}J. (2.17) 
r=O 
The block-diagonal structure of Q and A implies that the values of the target 
variables at time t are independent of their values at previous and at later 
time periods. This is denoted as the assumption of inter-temporal separability 
of the objectives. The combination of (2.17) with (2.14) is known as the 
linear-quadratic (LQ) control problem. This shows that the multiperiod Theil 
problem may be reduced to a linear quadratic control problem by assuming 
intertemporal separability of the objectives and unidirectional causality of the 
population system. The advantage of describing a dynamic policy problem by 
an LQ control model is not only a reduction in scale, but also that an 
analytical solution to the problem can be obtained. The optimal time path of 
the policy measures may be represented by a simple feedback control law. 
The calculation of the optimal trajectory will be discussed in Part II of this 
paper. If the conditions of intertemporal separability of the objectives and 
unidirectional causality of the population system are not met, the dynamic 
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generalization of the Theil problem must be solved using a quadratic 
programming algorithm [Theil (1964, ch. 4)]. 
3. Existence and design of optimal migration policies in the Tinbergen 
framework 
It is argued that there are two central issues in the theory of policy. These 
are the concepts of existence and of design. Existence of policy refers to the 
controllability of the system or the ability to design any policy at all; design 
refers to the techniques for designing optimal policies once existence is 
assured. Although both issues have been recognized for a long time in system 
theory, policy analysis in the social sciences, led by the theory of economic 
policy, has focused almost entirely on the design problem. 
Only Tinbergen (1963) has given considerable attention to both issues. His 
work is reviewed in this section and reformulated to provide a direct link 
with the study of existence and design in the dynamic state-space framework 
in Part II of the paper. The purpose of integrating the Tinbergen and the 
state-space frameworks is to show that the Tinbergen policy problem is a 
particular case of a more general class of policy problems. 
3.1 Existence theorem 
Recall the Tinbergen model (2.3): 
In the original formulation, (2.3) represented a static policy problem, i.e., the 
targets and the instruments belonged to the same time period. The model, 
however, may include lagged variables in the vector of uncontrollable 
variables {z2 }. Contrary to Preston's (1974, p. 65) claim, the Tinbergen 
model also fits dynamic situations, where the targets and instruments belong 
to different time periods. This is shown in (2.11). The cornerstone of 
Tinbergen's theory of policy is the condition for which there exists for any 
{ji} a corresponding unique policy vector {ii} such that (2.3) is satisfied. In 
other words, under what conditions has (2.3) a unique solution for { z i}? The 
necessary and sufficient condition is that R is of full rank, and that the 
number of targets is equal to the number of instruments. This statement is 
general enough to encounter dynamic policy problems where time series of 
targets are given and where time series of instruments are sought. The 
uniqueness of the instrument vector is an unnecessarily restrictive condition. 
An infinite number of policy vectors may exist which lead to the same target 
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vector. The controllability theorem for the Tinbergen model is, therefore, 
stated as follows: 
Theorem 1. Tinbergen Controllability Theorem. The policy model (2.3 ), 
{y} = R { z i} + S { z2 }, is controllable for all {y} = {.V} if and only if the matrix 
multiplier R satisfies the condition rank (R) = N , where N is the number of 
targets. The control vector { z 1 } is unique if R is N x N. This condition is a 
reformulation of Tinbergen's proposition that there exist as many instruments 
as there are targets. 
To prove Theorem 1, recall that R is a N x K matrix, where N is the 
number of targets and K is the number of instruments. In the previous 
section, we made the assumption that both the targets and the instruments 
are linearly independent. This implies that the equations of (2.3) are 
independent. The system (2.3) is consistent, i.e., has a solution if and only if 
the number of unknowns K is equal to the number of equations N. But this 
implies that the rank of R is N . If K is less than N, the rank of R is K <N, 
and the system is inconsistent. The general solution to a consistent system is 
[Rogers (1971, p. 258)] 
where R< 1 > is a generalized inverse of R, satisfying 
RR< 1>R=R, 
and { c} is an arbitrary vector. 
If K > N, there exists an infinite number of instrument vectors associated 
with {y}. However, in most cases, there is only one instrument vector which 
is most suited to the policy maker's preferences. The design of such a policy 
vector will be discussed in the next section. If on the other hand K =N, then 
R is non-singular and (2.3) has a unique solution, 
3.2. Design of optimal migration policies 
Any design of optimal policies should begin with a statement of objectives. 
In the previous section, the question was answered : Under what conditions is 
it possible to specify certain objectives or targets and to achieve them by the 
instruments at hand ? It was shown that under very specific conditions, there 
is a unique instrument vector assuring the achievement of the targets. The 
optimal levels of the instrument variables then follow directly. Under other 
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conditions, however, there is an infinite number of combinations of the 
instruments that lead to the desired targets. In this case, the policy maker is 
confronted with an additional decision problem : which alternative set of 
instruments to choose. This requires the set-up of a cost function or welfare 
loss function which aggregates the relative costs incurred by the implemen-
tation of each instrument. The feasible set of instruments may also be limited 
by imposing constraints on them. A further possibility is that the objectives 
are overstated, i.e., that no combination of instruments can be found that 
realizes all the targets. The system is uncontrollable and again the policy 
maker has an additional decision to make : where should he modify his 
preference system? Is he willing to give up some targets completely in order 
to achieve the others, or is he satisfied with approximating all the targets 
without reaching them exactly? This amounts to specifying a welfare function 
of the target variables of interest. The coefficients of the welfare function are 
the trade-offs between the target variables. The specification of the cost and 
the welfare function is the most difficult and the most socially sensitive task 
in the policy design process. In this paper, we make the assumption that 
these functions are given by the policy maker. 
This section discusses the design of optimal policies in the Tinbergen 
framework. It will be shown that in some instances implicit objective 
functions may be used to derive the optimal policy. The unifying feature of 
this section is the notion of the generalized inverse [see also Russell and 
Smith (1975)]. The importance of the minimizing properties of generalized 
inverses for policy analysis will be illustrated. 
From section 3.1, we know that an optimal policy exists if the rank of the 
impact multiplier matrix R is equal to the number of targets. Following 
Tinbergen, we consider three cases according to the relationship between the 
number of targets (N) and the number of instruments (K) or, equivalently, to 
the rank of the multiplier matrix and its singularity property. 
3.2.1. The matrix multiplier is non-singular and of rank N 
Recall eq. (2.3): 
If R is non-singular, then the optimal policy is unique and given by (2.4), 
It is clear from (2.4) that the policy depends not only on the target vector, 
but also on the uncontrollable variables. If { z2 } has some lagged endogenous 
variables, then the effects of past policies will be felt in the current policy. 
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The nature of the dependence of {ii} upon {.Y} is associated with different 
types of structures of the matrix R. They were discussed in section 2. Since 
there is only one possible set of instruments leading to the target vector {y}, 
no cost or welfare function is needed to distinguish between alternatives. 
3.2.2. The matrix multiplier is singular and of rank N 
If N <K, there exists an infinite number of instrument vectors which lead 
to the achievement of a preassigned value of the target vector. The solution 
set to (2.3) may be represented by 
R{ii} = {.Y} -S{z2 }, (3.1) 
{ii} =Rr1>[{ji}-S{z2 }J + [J-R0 >RJ {c}, 
where R(l l is a generalized inverse of R, satisfying 
and {c} is an arbitrary vector. 
In order to get a unique instrument vector, one must impose additional 
conditions on {ii} . Two illustrations are given of how this may be done. 
Both minimize a function of {zi} over a constrained set. The first illustration 
is the formulation of a general mathematical programming problem. The 
second makes use of the minimizing properties of some types of generalized 
mverses. 
Illustration (a). Suppose a cost or welfare loss function f ( { z i}) has been 
defined. One wants to minimize this function subject to the dynamic 
behavior of the system and to some other constraints imposed upon the 
instrument vector and represented by the vector-valued inequality g ( { z i}) 
~ 0. The problem then may be formulated as a mathematical programming 
problem, 
subject to 
min f ( { z i} ), 
{y} =R{z 1 } +S{z2 }, 
g({ zi}) ~ 0. 
(3.2) 
If g({ z2 }) andf({zi}) are both linear, the problem is a linear programming 
problem and can be solved by the simplex technique. 
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Illustration (b ). This illustration is a special case of the problem (3.2). We 
delete the constraint g({zi} )~O, and we let f ({zi}) be the Euclidean norm 
defined on { z i}, i.e., 
1 f ({zi} )= [{zi}'{zi}F. (3.3) 
Ben-Israel and Greville (1974, p. 114) prove that the unique solution to this 
problem is given by 
(3.4) 
where R< 1 •4 i is a generalized inverse satisfying 
and 
[R<t ,4J R]' = [R<t ,4J R]. 
Because R< 1•4 l defines a minimum norm solution to (2.3), it is often called the 
'minimum-norm inverse'. 
There may be other norms defined on the instrument vector. Suppose the 
policy maker lists some most acceptable values of the instrument variables 
{ii}, and wants to minimize the squared deviation between the optimal 
values and these preassigned values. The policy model is then 
min f ( { z 1}) = 11 { z 1} - { i 1} 11 
(3.5) 
subject to 
{.V} =R{zi} +S{z2 }. 
The optimal solution is given by 
(3.6) 
The matrix R< 1•4 l has a special meaning for policy analysis. An element rlJ ·4 l 
indicates the change in the ith instrument variable required for a unit change 
in the jth target variable, assuming that {z2 }, and, in the second case, also 
{ii} remain unchanged. It is, therefore, a multiplier in the economic sense, 
measuring the relative effectiveness of the ith instrument. 
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3.2.3. The matrix multiplier is singular and of rank K 
If N>K, the system (2.3) is inconsistent and no solution exists, i.e., the 
residual vector { r} is non-zero, where 
{r} = [{y}-S{z2 }]-R{ zi} = {y}-{y}, 
where {.Y} is the realized value of the target vector. 
In this case, it is common to search for an approximate solution of (2.3), 
which makes { r} closest to zero in some sense. Again two illustrations will be 
given. As before, the first is a mathematical programming model, namely, a 
quadratic programming model, and the second applies the minimizing 
properties of some generalized inverses. 
Illustration (a) . Theil (1964, p. 159) was the first to assume that a policy 
maker, confronted with an overstatement of his goals set, i.e., N >K, 
formulates his preferences as a quadratic function of the target and control 
variables. The Theil model has been given in section 2 without proposing a 
solution to it. Recall the model (2. 7): 
min W({ z1}) = {a}' { z1 } + {b}' {y} +H { z1 }'A { z1 } 
+ {y}' B{y} + { zi}'C {y} + {Y}'C' { zi}J, 
subject to (2.3), 
{y} =R{zi} +S{z2 }, 
where A, B, C, are symmetric positive definite weight matrices. This 
optimization problem may be solved by means of the Lagrangean technique. 
An alternative method of deriving the optimum consists of using the 
constraints to eliminate the target vector in the objective function and then 
minimizing this function unconditionally with respect to the instruments 
[Theil (1964, pp. 40-41)]. This solution procedure is also followed by 
Friedman (1975, p. 159). Substituting the constraint in the objective 
function gives 
where 
K 0 = { b}'S{ z2 } +t[[S { z2}J' B[S { z2 }]], 
{k} = {a} +R'{ b} + [C + R' B][S{z2 }J, 
K=A +R'BR+CR+R'C'. 
(3.7) 
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The first order condition for minimizing W ( { z 1}) with respect to the 
instrument vector { z i} is 
d W ( { z 1 } )/d{ z 1 } = { O} = { k} + K { z 1 }. 
The optimal solution follows immediately, 
(3.8) 
where K and { k} are as defined in (3. 7). The second order condition for the 
minimization of W ( { z 1}) with respect to { zi} is that K is positive definite. 
The corresponding value of the target vector is 
(3.9) 
It should be noted that a non-trivial solution to (3.9) exists only if { k} is 
non-zero. 
Illustration (b ). Suppose the policy maker only wants to minimize { r} . The 
model may be considered as a variant of the Theil model, 
l 
min [[ {ji} - {y}J'[ {ji}- {Y}J]2, (3.10) 
subject to 
The objective function defines the Euclidean norm of { r}. Ben-Israel and 
Greville (1974, p. 104) show that the optimal solution to this problem is 
given by 
(3.11) 
where R< 1•3> is the generalized inverse of R satisfying 
RR< 1•3lR=R, 
Because of the property that R< 1•3 l minimizes the Euclidean norm of the 
residual vector, i.e., the sum of squares of the residuals, it is called the 'least-
squares inverse'. An element r!}· 3l indicates how much the ith instrument has 
to change for a unit change in the jth target variable, in order to maintain 
the smallest sum of squared deviations between the realized and the pre-
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assigned values of the target variables. The general least-squares solution is 
(3.12) 
where { c} is an arbitrary K x 1 vector. 
Ben-Israel and Greville note that the least-squares solution is unique only 
when R is of full column rank. This condition is always satisfied in policy 
models discussed here, since we have assumed initially that the instruments 
are linearly independent. 
This illustration shows that the least-squares generalized inverse is the 
solution to a special variant of the Theil model. A similar observation was 
made by Russell and Smith (1975, p. 143). 
4. Conclusion 
This was the first part of a paper on a comprehensive analytical 
framework for the study of optimal migration and population distribution 
policies. It presented the conceptutal framework, namely, the Tinbergen 
paradigm, and demonstrated how it may encompass a wide variety of policy 
models. The Tinbergen paradigm is particularly useful to isolate the policy-
relevant part of a system described by a demometric or demographic-
economic model, and to transform this model into a policy model. It was 
shown that any linear descriptive or explanatory model may be converted to 
a policy model if and only if all the target variables of the policy model 
belong to the set of endogenous variables of the descriptive or explanatory 
model, and if at least one of the exogenous variables is controllable. 
The general formulation of a policy model is given in (2.3), 
with {y} the vector of target variables, {zi} the vector of instrument 
variables and { z2 } the vector of uncontrollable exogenous and lagged 
endogenous variables. An important role in policy analysis is played by the 
matrix multiplier R. Our discussion of policy models centered around this 
multiplier. This is consistent with the economic literature on policy models. 
To present an overview of policy models, a classification scheme was set up 
that is based on the rank and the structure of R. This scheme enabled us to 
relate seemingly unrelated models to each other. For example, it was shown 
that the linear-quadratic control problem may be derived from the Tinbergen 
and Theil model by assuming intertemporal separability of the objectives and 
unidirectional causality of the population system. The state-space model also 
may be derived from the Tinbergen model, and from the reduced form model 
in general. 
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The fundamental questions of quantitative migration policy may be 
expressed in terms of existence and design. In section 3 we dealt with these 
two topics. The discussion revolved around the matrix multiplier. Whether 
arbitrarily specified levels of target variables can be reached by the existing 
set of instruments depends on the rank of R. The condition that must be 
satisfied for a population system, described by a Tinbergen model, to be 
controllable, was formulated as an existence theorem. In Part II of the paper, 
some existence theorems will be formulated for dynamic populations de-
scribed by a state-space model. The introduction of dynamics into the study 
of the existence of optimal policies will require to change the way of thinking 
engendered by Tinbergen's Theory of Policy. The reformulation of 
Tinbergen's findings in this part of the paper aimed at providing the 
necessary connections. 
The design procedure of optimal policies is dictated by the structure and 
the rank of the matrix multiplier R. If R is non-singular, then the unique 
solution to (2.3) for { zi} is found by simply inverting R. When R is singular, 
there may be no instrument vector leading to the desired target values, or 
there may be an infinite number of them. To find a unique optimal solution, 
an objective function reflecting the policy maker's preferences is introduced, 
and mathematical programming techniques may be applied, There is a wide 
variety of algorithms available in the literature. The common characteristic 
of most of them is that they determine the optimal solution numerically. In 
this study, we have directed our attention to cases where solutions to policy 
problems can be found analytically. 
In this regard, there is the applicability of the notion of generalized 
inverse. We have shown how the minimizing properties of generalized 
inverses may be relevant in solutions of policy models with a singular 
multiplier matrix. For example, no matter what the rank of the N x K matrix 
R is, a unique solution to (2.3) is given by 
where RP is the Moore-Penrose inverse [Ben-Israel and Greville (1974, p. 
7)]. If R is non-singular, then RP is the ordinary inverse; if R is singular and 
of rank N, i.e., the number of instruments exceeds the number of targets, 
then RP defines a minimum norm solution to (2.3), and if R is singular and of 
rank K, i.e., the targets exceed the instruments in number, then RP defines a 
solution to (2.3) that minimizes the squared deviations between the desired 
and the realized vaiues of the target variables. No explicit objective function 
has been specified, but it is implicit in the minimizing properties of the 
generalized inverses. The interesting feature of generalized inverses is that 
they provide an analytical solution to policy models. 
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